Ressource non renouvelable polluante: décentralisation de l'optimum en présence d'un pouvoir de marché

Polluting nonrenewable resources: decentralization of the optimum in the presence of market power

Antoine Belgodere

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: In this paper, I study the strategic interactions between a country that owns a monopoly on a polluting non renewable resource (basically, the OPEC), and a representative of countries that both consume the resource and are hurt by its pollution. Both pollution control and rent captation are at stake in this model.

Keywords: nonrenewable resources; stok pollution; differetial games (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: H23 Q3 Q54 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2007
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:28278

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