Corporate governance in the Netherlands
Wilko Bolt () and
Marga Peeters ()
MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany
This study answers some elimentary questions about Dutch shareholding structures, such as the structure in the Netherlands in comparison with other countries and the change in investors groups' interests in shares investments. We concentrate on banks. Banks have a particular position in that they can be a lender as well as an investor in a certain company. Their investments' possibilities in risky assets have always been restricted in order to protect the bank's creditors, though these restrictions weakened in the early eighties. We provide insights in their portfolio investments' behaviour. In addition to this statistical evidence, the recent Dutch discussion on corporate governance is summarized. This can encourage an international discussion.
Keywords: corporate governance; banks; risky assets; portfolio investments; share structure (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: O16 G34 G21 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Published in Corporate governance, financial markets and global convergence - Balling et al (eds) (1998): pp. 89-110
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Working Paper: Corporate governance in the Netherlands (1997)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:28694
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