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Incentives in Merchant Empires: Portuguese and Dutch Labor Compensation

Claudia Rei ()

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: The different organizational structure of the Portuguese and Dutch merchant empires affected their ability to monitor workers. I test the theoretical implications of these differences using micro data of overseas workers' compensation from the sixteenth to the eighteenth century. The two merchant empires used significantly different compensation structures: working for the king of Portugal corresponded to a higher bonus share of compensation on average than that of the Dutch East India Company. These results are consistent with theoretical implications and provide additional support to the historical evidence we have on the organizational structure of merchant empires.

Keywords: Merchant Empires; Labor Compensation; Incentives; Monitoring (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: N34 J33 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cis, nep-his, nep-hrm and nep-lab
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