Repeated moral hazard and contracts with memory: The case of risk-neutrality

Susanne Ohlendorf and Patrick Schmitz
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Susanne Goldlücke

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: We consider a repeated moral hazard problem, where both the principal and the wealth-constrained agent are risk-neutral. In each of two periods, the agent can exert unobservable effort, leading to success or failure. Incentives provided in the second period act as carrot and stick for the first period, so that the effort level induced in the second period is higher after a first-period success than after a failure. If renegotiation cannot be prevented, the principal may prefer a project with lower returns; i.e., a project may be "too good" to be financed or, similarly, an agent can be "overqualified."

Keywords: Dynamic moral hazard; hidden actions; limited liability (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C73 D86 J33 M52 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-bec, nep-cta and nep-ppm
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (10)

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Related works:
Journal Article: REPEATED MORAL HAZARD AND CONTRACTS WITH MEMORY: THE CASE OF RISK‐NEUTRALITY (2012)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:28823

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