Reactivity in decision-form games

David Carfì ()

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: In this paper we introduce the reactivity in decision-form games. The concept of reactivity allows us to give a natural concept of rationalizable solution for decision-form games: the solubility by elimination of sub- reactive strategies. This concept of solubility is less demanding than the concept of solubility by elimination of non-reactive strategies (introduced by the author and already studied and applied to economic games). In the work we define the concept of super-reactivity, the preorder of re- activity and, after a characterization of super-reactivity, we are induced to give the concepts of maximal-reactivity and sub-reactivity; the latter definition permits to introduce the iterated elimination of sub-reactive strategies and the solubility of a decision-form game by iterated elimina- tion of sub-reactive strategies. In the paper several examples are devel- oped. Moreover, in the case of normal-form games, the relation between reactivity and dominance is completely revealed.

Keywords: Decision form games; reactivity; dominance (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C02 C70 C72 C73 C79 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009
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