On Integration Policies and Schooling

Jose Alcalde and Begoña Subiza

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: This paper proposes a reform for school allocation procedures in order to help integration policies reach their objective. For this purpose, we suggest the use of a natural two-step mechanism. The (stable) first step is introduced as an adaptation of the deferred-acceptance algorithm designed by Gale and Shapley (1962), when students are divided into two groups. The (efficient) second step captures the idea of exchanging places inherent to Gale's Top Trading Cycle. This latter step could be useful for Municipal School Boards when implementing some integration policies.

Keywords: Integration Policy; School Allocation; Affirmative Action (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 I28 J18 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011-02-24
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-edu, nep-lab and nep-ure
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Related works:
Working Paper: On integration policies and schooling (2012)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:29145

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