Differentiable game complete analysis for tourism firm decisions

David Carfì ()

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: In this paper we apply the complete analysis of a differentiable game (recently introduced by the author) to determine possible suitable behaviors (actions) of tourism firms during strategic interactions with other tourism firms, from both non-cooperative and cooperative point of view. To associate with a real strategic interaction among tourism firms a differentiable game any player’s strategy-set must, for instance, be a part of a topological vector space, closure of an open subset of the space. The most frequent case is that in which the strategy-sets are compact intervals of the real line. On the other hand, very often, the actions at disposal of a player can form a finite set, and in this case a natural manner to construct a game representing the economic situation is the von Neumann convexification (also known as canonical extension) that leads to a differentiable game with probabilistic scenarios, and thus even more suitable for the purpose of represent real interactions. For what concerns the complete analysis of a differentiable game, its first goal is the precise knowledge of the Pareto boundaries (maximal and minimal) of the payoff space, this knowledge will allow us to evaluate the quality of the different Nash equilibria (by the distances from the Nash equilibria themselves to Pareto boundaries, with respect to appropriate metrics), in order to determine some “focal” equilibrium points collectively more satisfactory than each other. Moreover, the complete knowledge of the payoff-space will allow to develop explicitly the cooperative phase of the game and the various bargaining problems rising from the strategic interaction of the tourist firms (Nash bargaining problem, Kalai-Smorodinski bargaining problem and so on). In the paper we shall deal with some practical study cases.

Keywords: Tourism fir; differentiable game; strategic interaction; non-cooperative behaviour; cooperative behavior; Pareto efficiency. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C7 C71 C72 C78 D21 L1 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (10)

Published in Proceedings of THE 2009 INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON TOURISM and WORKSHOP on Sustainable tourism within High Risk areas of environmental crisis (2009): pp. 1-10

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