Did the Commercial Paper Funding Facility Prevent a Great Depression Style Money Market Meltdown?

John Duca

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: This paper analyzes how risk premia—and other factors affecting the comparative advantages of security-funded versus deposit-funded short-run debt—altered the relative use of debt funded by securities markets since the early-1960s and the relative use of commercial paper during the recent financial crisis. Results indicate that lower risk premia, higher information costs, and reserve requirement costs induce less relative use of commercial paper and short-run debt funded by securities markets. This paper also finds that Federal Reserve interventions in the money market helped prevent the commercial paper market from melting down to the extent seen during the early 1930s.

Keywords: Great Depression; Commercial Paper; Financial Frictions; Credit Rationing (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: E44 E50 N12 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010-11-04, Revised 2011-02-22
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

Downloads: (external link)
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/29255/1/MPRA_paper_29255.pdf original version (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Did the commercial paper funding facility prevent a Great Depression style money market meltdown? (2013)
Working Paper: Did the commercial paper funding facility prevent a Great Depression-style money market meltdown? (2011)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:29255

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany Ludwigstraße 33, D-80539 Munich, Germany. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Joachim Winter ().