Non-reactive strategies in decision-form games

David Carfì () and Angela Ricciardello

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: In this paper we propose a concept of rationalizable solution for two-player decision-form games: the solution by iterated elimination of non-reactive strategies. Several original theorems are proved about this kind of solution. We study the relations between solutions by iterated elimination of non reactive strategies and game equilibria. We present an existence theorem for bistrategies surviving the iterated elimination and an existence theorem for solution by iterated elimination in contracting games. We, also, show that an equilibrium of a game survives iterated elimination of non-reactive strategies. At the end we prove a characterization of solvability by iterated elimination of non-reactive strategies.

Keywords: Decision-form games; rationalizable solution; reactivity; equilibrium; iterated elimination of strategies (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C7 C70 C72 C79 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

Published in AAPP | Physical, Mathematical, and Natural Sciences 1.LXXXVI(2009): pp. 1-12

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