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Elected Oligarchy and Economic Underdevelopment: The Case of Guyana

Tarron Khemraj and Diana Hinova

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: This study proposes the idea that Guyana’s present government can be categorized as an elected oligarchy. It highlights the existence of several binding constraints (or structural bottlenecks) and demonstrates how these constraints are exacerbated by the elected oligarchy to impair the economic development of the country. Using stylized data on economic trends, the paper illustrates the direct and indirect channels through which the elected oligarchy stifles the private sector and consequently economic progress. As such, the paper presents the elected oligarchy as an alternative channel through which private investments are crowded out by the political strategy of the state.

Keywords: Private sector crowding out; Elected oligarchy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: B50 O10 O54 P40 P48 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011-03
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:29733

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