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On the number of blocks required to access the coalition structure core

Sylvain Béal, Eric Rémila and Philippe Solal

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: This article shows that, for any transferable utility game in coalitional form with nonempty coalition structure core, the number of steps required to switch from a payoff configuration out of the coalition structure core to a payoff configuration in the coalition structure core is less than or equal to (n*n+4n)/4, where n is the cardinality of the player set. This number considerably improves the upper bound found so far by Koczy and Lauwers (2004).

Keywords: coalition structure core; excess function; payoff configuration; outsider independent domination. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011-03-22
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-gth and nep-net
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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