All-Pay Auctions with Budget Constraints

Maciej Kotowski and Fei Li

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: Consider an all-pay auction with interdependent, affiliated valuations and private budget constraints. We characterize a symmetric equilibrium for the case of two players. In contrast with the second-price auction, making budgets more severe can depress the bids of unconstrained bidders

Keywords: All-Pay Auction; Budget Constraints; Lobbying; War of Attrition; Common Values; Private Values (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D44 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011-03-20
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cta and nep-mkt
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/35957/2/MPRA_paper_35957.pdf revised version (application/pdf)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:30468

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