Information asymmetry and institutions: re-looking at autonomous councils in the hills district of Assam

Saswati Choudhury

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: Abstract The transaction cost approach can be used as a tool for studying the political institutions which engage in sharing of power and responsibilities. This paper makes an attempt to present an analytical framework of governance structure in the Autonomous Councils in the two hills districts of Karbi Anglong and N.C. Hills in the State of Assam. The first section of the paper gives a brief introduction to the theoretical framework of the transaction cost and information asymmetry and moral hazard problem. In the next section, these concepts are examined in the context of the autonomous councils in the hills district.

Keywords: Information Asymmetry; Moral Hazard; principal; agent (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: B52 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009-12, Revised 2010-03
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/30848/1/MPRA_paper_30848.pdf original version (application/pdf)
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/34958/1/MPRA_paper_34958.pdf revised version (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:30848

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany Ludwigstraße 33, D-80539 Munich, Germany. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Joachim Winter ().