Does timing of decisions in a mixed duopoly matter?
Tamás L. Balogh and
Attila Tasnádi
MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany
Abstract:
We determine the endogenous order of moves in a mixed price-setting duopoly. In contrast to the existing literature on mixed oligopolies we establish the payoff equivalence of the games with an exogenously given order of moves. Hence, it does not matter whether one becomes a leader or a follower. We also establish that replacing a private firm by a public firm in the standard Bertrand-Edgeworth game with capacity constraints increases social welfare and that a pure-strategy equilibrium always exists.
Keywords: Bertrand-Edgeworth; mixed duopoly; timing games (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D43 L13 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011-05-19
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-bec, nep-com, nep-gth and nep-ind
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https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/30993/1/MPRA_paper_30993.pdf original version (application/pdf)
Related works:
Journal Article: Does timing of decisions in a mixed duopoly matter? (2012) 
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:30993
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