Heuristic Schelling: economy of organized crime

Fernando Estrada

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: This article proposes a reading of the armed conflict from an evolutionary design that takes into account the concept of private protection agencies in the works of Schelling. Their aim is to assess the dynamics of conflict and changes from its author's scientific output. A context of conflicts that includes new expressions of violence and the relative failure of the paramilitary reintegration involves using new analytical models (argumentation, game theory and inconsistent information). The recent evolution of emerging gangs and their expansion into areas that were paramilitary camps requires monitoring not only of the government and the authorities, but those investigating the conflict in the present tense. The author provides heuristic research support from Schelling’s theory of strategy, recent contributions to the relationship between organized crime and drug cartels.

Keywords: Colombia; Government; Civil War; Latin America; Security; Protection Agencies. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: A10 B00 C7 C72 D74 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011-06-06
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