Indépendance de la banque centrale et efficacité de la politique économique

Central bank independence and effectiveness of economic policy

Willy Freddie Ndjana, Didier Alia () and Paulin Mendo

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: This paper examines the different interactions that can exist between an independent central bank and the economic policy in a country. The focal point of this survey is based on the « temporal incoherence »problem raised in the years 1970 by Prescott and Kydland. These two authors arrived to the conclusion that, the separation between public authorities and monetary authorities would guarantee an economic stability. The rush observed since some years of the central banks toward the independence vis-`a-vis of public authorities contributed to carry a decisive stroke to the economic policy’s efficiency thus.

Keywords: Central bank; independance; temporal incoherence; economic policy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: E02 E58 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009-03
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:31372

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