In nitely-lived agents via two-sided altruism

Abdelkrim Seghir and Sherif Salem ()

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: In an incomplete market with two sided altruistic agents and default.We show equilibrium existence if members of a dynasty act in an individualistic way by maximizing their own intergenerational utility functions. We also illustrate that a dynasty may end doing Ponzi schemes if its members act in a collectivistic way by maximizing a dynasty's collectivistic utility. We also prove that Ponzi schemes are ruled out and equilibrium existence is restored if there exist, always in the future, some agents who are not too altruistic either towards their parents or their ospring.

Keywords: Innitely-Lived Agents; Two-Sided Altruism; Individualistic Equilibrium; Collectivstic Equilibrium. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D52 D64 D91 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010-09-21
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-hpe
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/31379/1/MPRA_paper_31379.pdf original version (application/pdf)
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/31828/1/MPRA_paper_31828.pdf revised version (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:31379

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany Ludwigstraße 33, D-80539 Munich, Germany. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Joachim Winter ().