Positive self-image in tournaments

Luís Santos-Pinto

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: This paper analyzes the implications of worker overestimation of productivity for firms in which incentives take the form of tournaments. Each worker overestimates his productivity but is aware of the bias in his opponent’s self-assessment. The manager of the firm, on the other hand, correctly assesses workers’ productivities and self-beliefs when setting tournament prizes. The paper shows that, under a variety of circumstances, firms make higher profits when workers have positive self-image than if workers do not. By contrast, workers’ welfare declines due to their own misguided choices.

Keywords: Self-Image; Tournaments; Behavioral Economics (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: A12 J41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2003-11-10, Revised 2007-02-27
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/3140/1/MPRA_paper_3140.pdf original version (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: POSITIVE SELF-IMAGE IN TOURNAMENTS (2010)
Working Paper: Positive self-image in tournaments (2007)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:3140

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