Promoting scientific faculties: does it work? Evidence from Italy
Virginia Maestri
MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany
Abstract:
The object of this article is to assess the causal impact of promotions policies on students' choice of the field of study. We match the records of the students enrolled in two large universities with the records of the participating schools. Within the participating schools, some students took part in the program, while others did not. We adopted an "exposure" approach in which we define as treated all students of a cohort that were eligible for these activities. We find, on average, a positive and significant effect of the policy on targeted and non-targeted scientific bachelor's degrees and positive cross-treatment effects across subjects. However, if the policy has a considerable influence on male students' choices, it does not appear to have any effect on female students' choices. These findings suggest that the policy helped students in correcting their labor market expectations for graduating in science.
Keywords: economic impact; educational economics; school choice (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: H43 I23 I28 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009-04, Revised 2010-10
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:
Downloads: (external link)
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/31546/1/MPRA_paper_31546.pdf original version (application/pdf)
Related works:
Journal Article: Promoting scientific faculties: Does it work? Evidence from Italy (2013) 
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
HTML/Text
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:31546
Access Statistics for this paper
More papers in MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany Ludwigstraße 33, D-80539 Munich, Germany. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Joachim Winter ().