Illegal to punish or punish the illegals: Which way should Ukraine and Moldova choose?

Ted Lundgren

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: A government seeks to minimise the maximum expected utility of migrants and smugglers, but has to do this under constraints. It is argued that a vote maximising government should choose policies based on the relative weight of the introduced lobby utility function, which acts as a constraint. The model allows for calculation of simplified but optimal punishments, however this would require information about country-specific parameters. The model setting assumes that there is almost perfect competition between the facilitators (people smugglers).

Keywords: illegal migration; illegal immigration; irregular migration; undocumented migration; optimal punishments; punishments; Moldova; Ukraine; people smuggling; human smuggling; international migration; people smugglers; border control; punishment schemes; WNIS (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: F22 O15 O17 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2008-06-01
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Published in Revista Sciintifica “Studii Economice" 1-2 (2008): pp. 87-97

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