People smuggling syndicates: An oligopoly analysis in context of the Söderköping process

Ted Lundgren

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: In the article, a model of oligopolistic (duopolistic) competition between two people smuggling syndicates is developed. I consider the Cournot and Stackelberg cases. First, the deterministic case is considered, where I show the conditions of profit maximisation for the syndicates. Then, a model with stochastic variables is introduced, where the number of migrants are random. It is shown that the deterministic case is but a special case of the stochastic one, when the distribution is concentrated in one point.

Keywords: duopolistic competition; human smuggling; people smuggling; international migration; illegal migration; illegal immigration; people smuggling networks; people smuggling syndicates; people smugglers; oligopolistic theory; oligopoly; duopoly; illegal migrants (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: F22 L13 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2008-12-01
References: View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

Published in Revista ştiinţifică “Studii Economice" 3-4.2(2008): pp. 33-39

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