Coopetitive games and global green economy

David Carfì () and Daniele Schiliro' ()

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: The paper aims at providing a Game Theory model of coopetition which addresses the problem of the global Green Economy. The Green Economy is a theoretical model of sustainable development. This sustainable development model should lead to reduce emissions of greenhouse gases, determine the reduction of global pollution and the establishment of a sustainable and lasting global Green Economy, using mainly renewable resources. The paper applies the notion of coopetition, originally devised at microeconomic level, at a country level. The country has to decide whether it wants to collaborate with the rest of the world in getting an efficient Green Economy, even if the country is competing in the global scenario. The model provides a win-win solution, that shows the convenience for each country to participate actively to a program of sustainability and efficient resource allocation within a coopetitive framework.

Keywords: coopetition; game theory; differentiable Pareto analysis; natural resources; green economy; macroeconomic and global interaction. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: B21 C7 C71 C72 C78 F19 Q50 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011-07
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ene and nep-env
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:32035

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