Coopetitive games and sustainability in project financing

David Carfì (), Giusy Patané and Samantha Pellegrino

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: The paper provides a Game Theory model of coopetition which addresses the Project Financing problem of supporting the production of energy via sustainable renewable sources. In our analysis we consider two banks that may decide to invest in renewable and non-renewable energy sources. Several solutions of our coopetitive game are considered and determined explicitly.

Keywords: Sustainability; coopetition; Differentiable Pareto Analysis; Project Financing (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C7 C71 C72 G2 G21 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ene, nep-gth and nep-ppm
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:32039

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