Prohibition of parallel Imports as a hard core Restriction of Article 4 of Block Exception Regulation for vertical Agreements: European Law and Economics

Nikolaos Zevgolis and Panagiotis Fotis

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: This paper attempts, on the one hand, to reveal the main principles of Competition Law (regulatory and case law framework) covering the prevention of parallel trade, mainly the prohibition of parallel imports or exports, and on the other hand to cast light on the main effects of parallel imports prohibition imposed by an upstream supplier on the competitive structure of the downstream market. Especially, the regulatory framework relates Block Exception Regulation 330/2010, (ex Block Exception Regulation 2790/99), with Block Exception Regulation 461/2010 (ex Block Exception Regulation 1400/2002) in order to determine whether prohibition of parallel trade constitutes a hardcore restriction or not, while the economic analysis evaluates it in a geographical vertical market which constitutes an upstream and a downstream market with few suppliers & buyers respectively which sell goods to the final (domestic) consumers. The results indicate that prohibition of parallel imports by the upstream sellers causes vertical restraints to the domestic customers of the buyers.

Keywords: Antitrust Law; Vertical Restraints; Block Exception Regulation; Market Imperfection; Consumer Nondurables; Repeated Games of Oligopoly Theory (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C73 D43 K21 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011-08-16
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-law and nep-reg
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https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/34843/1/MPRA_paper_34843.pdf revised version (application/pdf)
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/38160/1/MPRA_paper_38160.pdf revised version (application/pdf)

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