A positive theory of cooperative games: The logit core and its variants

Friedel Bolle, Yves Breitmoser () and Philipp E. Otto

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: This paper proposes two generalization of the core and evaluates them on experimental data of assignment games (workers and firms negotiate wages and matching). The generalizations proposed allow for social utility components (e.g. altruism) and random utility components (e.g. logistic perturbations). These generalizations are well-established in analyses of non-cooperative games, and they prove to be both descriptive and predictive in the assignment games analyzed here. The "logit core" allows us to define a "stochastically more stable" relation on the outcome set, which has intuitive implications, and it fits better than alternative approaches such as random behavior cores and regression modeling.

Keywords: cooperative games; core; random utility; social preferences; laboratory experiment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 C90 D64 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011-08-19
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe, nep-evo, nep-exp, nep-gth, nep-hpe and nep-soc
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https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/42819/1/MPRA_paper_42819.pdf revised version (application/pdf)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:32918

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