Information and disclosure in strategic trade policy: Revisited
Fabio Antoniou () and
Nikos Tsakiris ()
MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany
In a recent paper, Creane and Miyagiwa (2008) show that the mode of competition (quantity or price) determines whether information sharing occurs between firms and governments within an international duopoly context in which the fims are located in different countries. In this paper, we show that the relative number of firms located in each country is also critical. In particular, we illustrate that with quantity competition and under the presence of demand and cost uncertainty information sharing does not occur when the number of firms in one country is higher than the number of firms in the other country. Moreover, we show that the informational prisoner's dilemma in the current context appears only when the number of firms across countries is equal.
Keywords: Information; uncertainty; strategic trade; multiple firms (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: F12 D83 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Journal Article: Information and Disclosure in Strategic Trade Policy: Revisited (2014)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:32949
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