A conjectural cooperative equilibrium for strategic form games
Sergio Currarini () and
Marco Marini
MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany
Abstract:
This paper presents a new cooperative equilibrium for strategic form games, denoted Conjectural Cooperative Equilibrium (CCE). This concept is based on the expectation that joint deviations from any strategy profile are followed by an optimal and noncooperative reaction of non deviators. We show that CCE exist for all symmetric supermodular games. Furthermore, we discuss the existence of a CCE in specific submodular games employed in the literature on environmental agreements.
Keywords: Strong Nash Equilibrium; Cooperative Games; Public Goods (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: A10 C7 C70 C71 D0 Q50 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2002-12
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)
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Related works:
Working Paper: A conjectural cooperative equilibrium for strategic form games (2002) 
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:33381
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