Economic incentives for optimal sulphur abatement in Europe

George Halkos

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: This paper reviews and develops a theoretical and empirical representation of economic incentives for the implementation of pollution control strategies. A number of alternative available economic instruments may be thought of which, if applied internationally, could encourage implementation of the desired abatement strategies by countries. The paper considers means of pushing the countries to minimize abatement cost with them. A comparison between the pollution targets achieved by the imposition of a uniform charge rate and by differentiated charge rates is discussed and empirical results are provided with associated conclusions. These results are then compared with a simple standards setting in the form of critical loads, in order to see in an empirical way if economic instruments work better than regulations.

Keywords: Economic instruments; optimal abatement; sulphur emissions; acid rain; mathematical programming, Europe (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C60 C71 N53 Q50 Q52 Q53 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1993
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

Published in Energy Sources 5.17(1995): pp. 517-534

Downloads: (external link)
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/33705/1/MPRA_paper_33705.pdf original version (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:33705

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany Ludwigstraße 33, D-80539 Munich, Germany. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Joachim Winter (winter@lmu.de).