Gestion publique du périmètre irrigué: Accord informel, corruption et recherche de rente

Public management of water in irrigated aera:informal agreement,corruption and rent-seeking

Hayet Ben Said

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: Abstract The public water management in irrigated perimeter is marked by some failures. We can mention the theft of water, corruption and rent-seeking. These failures result in wastage of this scarce resource. We propose to study the public management of irrigated perimeter using the theory of transaction cost. To this end, we conduct an inquiry in the delegation of "Souk Essebt" in governorate of Jendouba (North West of Tunisia). The qualitative and quantitative information collected is used to describe the functioning of the perimeter. We conduct descriptive and econometric study to verify theoretical hypothesis.

Keywords: public management of irrigated perimeter; transaction cost; theft of water; corruption; rent seeking; transaction cost (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: A12 B52 D23 I28 Q25 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011-10-20
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ara
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