The constitutional dilemma of European integration

Peter Kurrild-Klitgaard

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: The paper analyzes European integration from a constitutional economics perspective. It is argued that the use of the Prisoners' Dilemma as a description of the advantages of European integration is fallacious. If the situation is a PD, the solution is impossible; if it is not, it is unnecessary.

Keywords: Prisoners Dilemma; constitutions; constitutional economics; public choice; European Union (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D62 D70 D72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1998
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

Published in Explaining European integration (1998): pp. 270-296

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:35437

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