 Crise systémique et régulation financièreSystemic crisis and financial regulationMPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany Abstract: One of the privileged explanations of the current crisis is the sophistication and the weak transparency of financial markets which would have allowed speculative behavior to elude authorities’ supervision. This article develops a different view by putting the emphasis on the model of organization of financial systems. This is established on the predominance of micro-prudential supervision schemes following the hypothesis of free market efficiency. From 1980-90, prudential mechanisms have worked in favor of self-regulation models and the systemic stability is mainly founded on the individual security of banking institutions. We show that this orientation suffers from the fallacy of composition; the micro-prudential model turns out to be unsuitable for the management of systemic risks because of the absence of an automatic bridge between the micro and the macroeconomic levels. The new regulatory environment feeds then successive bubbles the recurrence of which seems to require a modification of the rules of organization to avoid the forced socialization of the losses of private actors. Keywords: Systemic crisis; efficient markets; regulatory schemes (search for similar items in EconPapers) Downloads: (external link) Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:35466 Access Statistics for this paper More papers in MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany Ludwigstraße 33, D-80539 Munich, Germany. Contact information at EDIRC. |
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