Theory and practice of falsified elections

Oleg Kapustenko

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: An analysis of falsified election results is presented. A model of the falsification process is proposed and simulations are performed. The model fits well the data of the parliamentary elections in Russia on December 4, 2011. It is shown that the "noise" of false votes is well separated from the fair “signal”, which can be extracted with high statistical accuracy (less than l%) allowing quantitative reconstruction of the falsification patterns.

Keywords: election; ballot stuffing; statistical analysis (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011-12-23
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-cmp and nep-pol
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:35543

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