Choosing Electoral Rules in the Presence of Corruption

Samia Tavares

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: Corruption is a problem that has been shown to adversely affect a country’s development. Recent studies have shown that a country’s electoral system can affect its corruption level. But if that is the case, then electoral rules could be chosen to maximize opportunities for corruption. This paper uses the recent wave of democratization and the resulting writing of new constitutions, which entailed in many cases the adoption of a new electoral system, to analyze the choice of electoral rules. Results suggest that more corrupt countries are more likely to adopt a plurality system than less corrupt ones.

Keywords: corruption; electoral system; government; democracy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 D73 H11 H77 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2007-02-06
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-pbe, nep-pol and nep-reg
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:3559

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