Infinite dimensional mixed economies with asymmetric information

Anuj Bhowmik and Jiling Cao

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: In this paper, we study asymmetric information economies consisting of both non-negligible and negligible agents and having ordered Banach spaces as their commodity spaces. In answering a question of Herves-Beloso and Moreno-Garcia in [17], we establish a characterization of Walrasian expectations allocations by the veto power of the grand coalition. It is also shown that when an economy contains only negligible agents a Vind's type theorem on the private core with the exact feasibility can be restored. This solves a problem of Pesce in [20].

Keywords: Asymmetric information; Exactly feasible; Ex-post core; mixed economy; NY-fine core; NY-private core; Robustly efficient allocation; NY-strong fine core; RW-fine core; Walrasian expectations allocation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 D41 D43 D51 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011-12-28
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cta and nep-gth
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