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Top management’s snooping: Is sneaking over employees’ productivity and job commitment a wise approach?

Syed Akif Hasan and Muhammad Imtiaz Subhani

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: The management’s responsibility is to monitor the employee’s performance but when it becomes a desire of the management to snoop/spy the employees’ performance then this act has a direct influence on the employees and their motivations. The paper investigates the effects of top management’s spying/snooping in the organization on employees’ productivity and job commitment. For the purpose a sample of 3500 employees via self-administered survey technique were analyzed. Tobit Model (Censored regression) has been used to interrogate the effect of snooping/ spying on employee productivity and commitment. Tobit Model marked findings that the approach of top management to snoop/spy on the employees’ productivity and job commitment affects adversely on the employees. Policy makers should adopt informal ways to practice snooping as it causes stress, mental illness, de-motivation and especially when snooping is via other co-workers and employees, it creates major disruption and a rise to politicking in organization, which effect the proper streamlining of business operations across the departments.

Keywords: Organizational spying/snooping; job commitment; employees’ productivity; stress (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: M12 O1 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-bec and nep-hrm
References: View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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