College Admissions Game: Early Action or Early Decision?

Ayşe Mumcu and Ismail Saglam

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: In this paper, we study the long-played, yet until now unmodeled, college admissions game over early admissions plans using a many-to-one matching framework. We characterize the equilibrium strategies of each college involving its early quota out of its total capacity, and the set of admissible and deferred students within its applicant pool independently from the early admissions plans of the colleges in the market. Given these strategies, we show that for each college early action is a weakly dominant choice between early admissions plans.

Keywords: Many-to-one matching; early action; early decision; college admissions (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 C78 D71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2007-06-15
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-edu, nep-gth and nep-lab
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https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/3592/1/MPRA_paper_3592.pdf original version (application/pdf)
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/4526/1/MPRA_paper_4526.pdf revised version (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: College Admissions Game: Early Action or Early Decision? (2008)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:3592

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