Extensive Capture: the rise of international industrial regulation

Carlos Marquez

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: This research project tries to show that a unified discourse and a single global policy for liberalization and competition cuts across the economic and legal theory of transnational regulations of industry. The tension mediated by the concepts of harmonization, meaning that one regulation/standard is better that multiple regulations/standards, and the theory of international liberalization, meaning deregulation is better that regulation, brings many doubts about the phenomenon of international industrial regulation. The core of this project is to restate the problem of regulatory capture at a transnational level and show how it is possible, and profitable, for large corporations to capture transnational regulators with multilateral regulation or deregulation processes.

Keywords: International industrial regulation; international law; soft law; hard law; harmonization; industrial organization; law and economics (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: K23 L51 L59 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2007-03, Revised 2007-05-19
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-his and nep-reg
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:3642

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