An economic model for water allocation in North Eastern Spain

Jorge Bielsa and Rosa Duarte

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: The aim of this paper is to construct and apply a model for the allocation of water between two competing users, namely irrigation and hydropower. The model is applied in a case study of a specific water system located in North Eastern Spain. Starting with an irrigation-hydropower joint income function, we develop a constrained maximisation process that takes into account the environmental, institutional and actual priority of the water rights. The resulting solution can be useful as a guide for potential bargains between users. Furthermore, we evaluate the results for different supply (precipitation) and water allotments (increase in irrigated land). The results show that there are sufficient incentives so as to reach agreements that lead to improvements in a Pareto sense without side payments.

Keywords: Environmental and Natural Resource Economics; Water Economics; Bargaining; Cooperative Games (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: Q21 Q25 Q34 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2001-09
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (9)

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