Lyapunov stability in an evolutionary game theory model of the labor market
Ricardo Araujo () and
MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany
In this paper the existence and stability of equilibria in an evolutionary game theory model of the labor market is studied by using the Lyapunov method. The model display multiple equilibria and it is shown that the Nash Equilibria of the static game are evolutionary stable equilibria in the game theory evolutionary set up. In this vein a complete characterization of the dynamics of an evolutionary model of the labor market is provided.
Keywords: Evolutionary game theory approach; labour market; informal economy; Lyapunov function (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C73 J23 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Journal Article: Lyapunov stability in an evolutionary game theory model of the labour market (2014)
Working Paper: Lyapunov stability in an evolutionary game theory model of the labor market (2011)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:36932
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