From the lab to the field: envelopes, dictators and manners

Jan Stoop ()

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: Results are reported of the first natural field experiment on the dictator game, where subjects are unaware that they participate in an experiment. In contrast to predictions of the standard economic model, dictators show a large degree of pro-social behavior. This paper builds a bridge from the laboratory to the field to explore how predictive findings from the laboratory are for the field. External validity is remarkably high. In all experiments, subjects display an equally high amount of pro-social behavior, whether they are students or not, participate in a laboratory or not, or are aware that they participate in an experiment or not.

Keywords: altruism; natural field experiment; external validity (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C70 C91 C93 D63 D64 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012-03-02
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe, nep-evo, nep-exp, nep-gth and nep-soc
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (28)

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Related works:
Journal Article: From the lab to the field: envelopes, dictators and manners (2014)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:37048

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