Cost of action, perceived intention, positive reciprocity, and signalling model

Kornpob Bhirombhakdi () and Tanapong Potipiti

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: This economic experiment tests the positive relationship between perceived intention and positive reciprocity by altering material-payoff structures in treatments, or material-payoff approach. To design the treatments, this study applies a signalling model to explain how the intention of an action is signalled and perceived. As a result from the model, cost of an action positively relates to the perceived intention. The results from seventy-nine subjects who participated in this four-session hand-run experiment that was double-blindly organized between August - September 2011 support the relationship. Moreover, this study hypothesizes on consistent decisions across treatments with different levels of perceived intention, and the results support the hypotheses. The insight into sacrificing and rewarding is the significant implication in this study.

Keywords: Behavioral economics; reciprocity; asymmetric information (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 C91 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012-02-19
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-exp and nep-soc
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/40246/1/MPRA_paper_40246.pdf revised version (application/pdf)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:37469

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