Legislative powers and (X)NGO’s

Borut Strazisar ()

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: (X)NGOs1 in nowadays world become more and more important player who not only fulfill the humanitarian goals but also fulfill political goals of it members or even its sponsors. For (X)NGOs late task becomes easier because state uses them as auxiliary legislator. There are diverse reasons for such practice such as: - modern states wants to promote their economy by omitting expensive and unclear legislation (following OECD proposals for legislative reforms); - governing political parties want to pass the political responsibility for tricky political decisions to another body (i.e. collective doubt); - (X)NGOs have more accurate information on certain legislative questions than parliament or government. This article deals with two major problems. In first part it analyzes pro et contra’s for delegation of legislative powers to NGOs and possible risks of such processes. Second part takes in consideration different kind of legislative solutions how to use (X)NGOs in legislative procedure.

Keywords: delegation of legislative powers; deregulation; self regulation; regulatory ferorm (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: K40 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2007-03
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-reg
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:3767

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