The sugar-pie game

Joseph E. Mullat

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: Playing a bargaining game the players are trying to enlarge their share of a sugar-pie. However, HE is not very keen on sweets and does not prefer a piece of the pie if the size of the pie is too small or too large. In HIS view, too small or too large pies are not of a reasonable quality. In contrast, SHE, the second actor, likes sweets what ever they are. HE is a soft negotiator but SHE is a tough negotiator. The paper addresses the problem: what should be HIS power of negotiations if an equal ½-division of the pie is desirable.

Keywords: bargaining power; bargaining game (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C78 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012-04-07
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth and nep-hpe
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