Unemployment accounts

Ofer Setty

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: Unemployment Accounts (UA) are mandatory individual saving accounts that can be used by governments as an alternative to the Unemployment Insurance (UI) system. I study a two tier UA-UI system where the unemployed withdraw from their unemployment account until it is exhausted and then receive unemployment benefits. The hybrid policy provides insurance to workers more efficiently than a traditional UI because it provides government benefits selectively. Using a structural model calibrated to the US economy, I find that relative to a two tier UI system the hybrid policy leads to a welfare gain of 0.9%.

Keywords: Unemployment Accounts; Unemployment Insurance; Job-search; Moral hazard; Mechanism Design; Optimal Policy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: E24 E61 J64 J65 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012-04-12
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-dge, nep-ias, nep-lab and nep-mac
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/38064/1/MPRA_paper_38064.pdf original version (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: Unemployment Accounts (2012)
Working Paper: Unemployment Accounts (2011)
Working Paper: Unemployment Accounts (2011)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:38064

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