How Do Indian Voters Respond to Candidates with Criminal Charges: Evidence from the 2009 Lok Sabha Elections

Bhaskar Dutta and Poonam Gupta

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: This paper examines the response of voters to candidates who have reported that they have criminal charges against them, within the framework of a simple analytical model which assumes that criminal charges give rise to some stigma amongst the electorate, and result in a negative effect on vote shares. Campaigning, the cost of which is borne from candidates’ wealth, helps a candidate to increase his or her expected vote share by winning over the “marginal” voter. A criminal candidate gets an additional benefit since he can use the campaigning to convince voters of his innocence, and so reduce the negative effects of the stigma associated with criminal charges. We test the implications of the model using data for the 2009 Lok Sabha elections in India, and find support for all the implications of the model. Our empirical results show that voters do penalise candidates with criminal charges; however, this negative effect is reduced if there are other candidates in the constituency with criminal charges; besides, the vote shares are positively related to candidate wealth, with the marginal effect being higher for the candidates with criminal charges.

Keywords: Elections; India (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: P16 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012-04-26
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/38417/1/MPRA_paper_38417.pdf original version (application/pdf)
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/53868/8/MPRA_paper_53868.pdf revised version (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: How Indian Voters Respond to Candidates with Criminal Charges: Evidence from the 2009 Lok Sabha Elections (2012)
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