Gifts bequests and family incentives

Mohamed Jellal () and François-Charles Wolff

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: In this note, we use the theory of incentive contracting to characterize the pattern of financial transfers within the family. Using an altruistic model based on bounded rationality with one parent and two children, we show that the parent may provide a lower gift to the less well-off child, while bequests are always compensatory

Keywords: Family incentives , Gifts; Bequests (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D1 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2007
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Journal Article: Gifts, bequests and family incentives (2007)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:38420

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