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Competition protection and Philip Kotler’s strategic recommendations

Anna Fornalczyk

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: P. Kotler’s recommendations of modern marketing tell managers how to achieve and maintain a dominant market position. Some of the recommended activities may, however, infringe European and Polish competition law. Objections are not raised by market success achieved as a result of high product quality, good customer care, high market shares, continuous product improvements, new product release, entry onto fast growing markets, and exceeding customer expectations. Competition law problems may appear when a given company, having reached a dominant position, starts abusing it by subjugating the market and dictating business conditions to other market players (suppliers, customers, consumers). This article focuses on predatory pricing, strategic alliances, mergers and acquisitions and State aid issues that may arise from the implementation of Kotler’s recommendations. For market success not to transform into a competition law problem, it is worth remembering the limitations imposed by competition law on the actions of dominant companies. The paper outlines these limitations.

Keywords: competition; dominant market position; predatory pricing; strategic alliances; preventive control of mergers and acquisitions; exploitive or anti-competitive practices; State aid; leniency procedure; Kotler’s theory of modern marketing (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: K21 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011
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