Sharing a polluted river network
Baomin Dong (),
Debing Ni and
Yuntong Wang ()
MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany
A polluted river network is populated with agents (e.g., firms, villages, municipalities, or countries) located upstream and downstream. This river network must be cleaned, the costs of which must be shared among the agents. We model this problem as a cost sharing problem on a tree network. Based on the two theories in international disputes, namely the Absolute Territorial Sovereignty (ATS) and the Unlimitted Territorial Integrity (UTI), we propose three different cost sharing methods for the problem. They are the Local Responsibility Sharing (LRS), the Upstream Equal Sharing (UES), and the Downstream Equal Sharing (DES), respectively. The LRS and the UES generalize Ni and Wang ("Sharing a polluted river", Games Econ. Behav., 60 (2007), 176-186) but the DES is new. The DES is based on a new interpretation of the UTI. We provide axiomatic characterizations for the three methods. We also show that they coincide with the Shapley values of the three different games that can be defined for the problem. Moreover, we show that they are in the cores of the three games, respectively. Our methods can shed light on pollution abatement of a river network with multiple sovereignties.
Keywords: River network; Water pollution; Cost sharing; the Shapley value (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 D61 D62 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-env, nep-gth and nep-net
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (18) Track citations by RSS feed
Downloads: (external link)
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/38839/1/MPRA_paper_38839.pdf original version (application/pdf)
Journal Article: Sharing a Polluted River Network (2012)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:38839
Access Statistics for this paper
More papers in MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany Ludwigstraße 33, D-80539 Munich, Germany. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Joachim Winter ().