Behavioral dynamics of tax compliance under an information services initiative

Michael McKee, Caleb Siladke and Christian Vossler
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Michael Jones ()

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: Tax authorities utilize the audit process, imposing penalties on tax evaders, as their primary means of enforcement. In recent years, a “service” paradigm, whereby tax authorities provide information about correct tax reporting to taxpayers, has shown the potential to further “encourage” correct tax reporting. This research utilizes laboratory experiments to investigate the behavioral dynamics pertaining to information acquisition and tax evasion. The results show that the overall effect of a helpful information service is to decrease tax evasion. Further, an audit has the behavioral effect of lowering information acquisition rates and increasing evasion immediately after experiencing a penalty. This effect persists (although diminishes) in subsequent tax reporting decisions.

Keywords: Tax evasion; Tax compliance; Behavioral Dynamics; Behavioral economics; Experimental economics (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C91 H26 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011-12-23
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-acc, nep-evo, nep-exp, nep-iue and nep-pbe
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:38865

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