Some effects of tax information services reliability and availability on tax reporting behavior

Christian Vossler, Michael McKee and Michael Jones (m3jones@bridgew.edu)

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: As an alternative to analyzing field data, our research utilizes controlled laboratory experiments with human decision makers and salient financial incentives. Within the laboratory, we determine (hence, know) the true tax liability, and then identify the effects of information services by systematically varying the setting across groups of players. In particular, our experimental design varies the degree of accessibility and accuracy of information services. Our design allows us to observe both the tax reporting behavior as well as the propensity of the taxpayer to obtain information by making information acquisition a (sometimes costly) choice.

Keywords: tax evasion; laboratory experiments (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C91 D8 H26 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011-06
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-acc, nep-exp and nep-iue
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

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